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POLITICAL QUESTIONS: THE JUDICIAL
CHECK ON THE EXECUTIVE
By PAUL D. CARRINGTON*
T has been observed that democratic processes are poor machinery
for international politics.1 It is surely true that the requisite
capacities for secrecy, dispatch, and confident expression are not
the properties of a government given to public deliberation and
partisan debate over every halting move. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was alert to these deficiencies of popular government
and the Presidency was created with a view to preventing a recurrence
The
of the hapless impotence which befell the earlier federation.
actions of the executive branch of the government were not pretold
by the open deliberation of its members; the executive establishment
was possessed of a continuity lending a capacity for quick, reflexive
action; and the Executive was made of a single political fabric, speaking in unison with confidence. Thus adapted in structure, the
Presidency was clothed with extensive powers concomitant to its
responsibilities for effectuating foreign policy and adjusting national
desires to international exigencies.
Presidential power is, of course, perilous as well as opportune; the
citizenry as well as the enemy can feel the impact. What is the counterpoise which holds the Executive in check when, in its dealings with
foreign powers, it treads upon the interests of the citizen? The
protection of the individual from an overreaching Executive is a
delicate surgery for which the congressional cutlass has been thought
ill-suited. Our political mores have left the operation largely to the
courts who, in their independence and in their traditions, have been
deemed better situated to shield private liberty from undue invasion
or inhibition. This article is concerned with a problem which arises
when a litigant seeks to challenge the propriety of executive action of
international significance.
In fulfilling its function as an international politician, the Executive
*A.B., 1952, University of Texas; LL.B., 1955, Harvard Law School. Private practice,

Dallas, Texas, 1955 to present. Member, Texas State Bar.
1. 1 DE TOCQtEVILLE, DEMOCRACY wNAMERIcA 273 (1862).
2. 1 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 63, 67, 70, 74, 140 (1911);
THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (Jay).
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acts upon two determinations. First, by the use of their intelligence
sources, the executive officers appraise the international situation.
Secondly, in the exercise of their expertise, the executive officers
select a course of action which is responsive to the situation. These
are determinations of fact and determinations of policy. The courts
have thought both of these determinations to be inappropriate for
judicial re-examination. The "political question" doctrine has been
invoked in default of reconsideration. 3
The reasons were perhaps best stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in

Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Co.:4
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ
for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are
not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information
properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be
taken into executive confidences. But even if courts could require full
disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy
is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by
those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance
or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial
intrusion or inquiry.5
3. Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Co, 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 415 (1839); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). The problem was
foreshadowed by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 170-71 (1803). The general rule has been applied to foreclose judicial consideration of a wide variety of questions. See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950);
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939);
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 56
(1870); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 Now.) 1 (1849).
See generally, Finkelstein,
Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARv. L. REv. 221 (1925); Finkelstein,
Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 338 (1924); Weston, Political Questions, 38
HARv. L. REv. 296 (1925); Note, Political Questions as Distinguished from Judicial
Questions, 24 Nonma DAME LAW. 231 (1949).
4. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
5. Id. at 111.

1956]

Political Questions

The individual harmed by the Executive's foreign policy is left in
an ambiguous position. He has a constitutional "right" to be protected
from arbitrary or capricious acts of the Executive, but the question
of whether the damaging act is arbitrary or capricious is not open to
inquiry. There is surely some embarrassment to the common notions
of our constitutional law in closing the courts to a private litigant
who has alleged a denial of his interests by an arbitrary act of the
Executive. Judge Vanderbilt has urged that such judicial deference
has created a grave constitutional imbalance in the scheme of separation of powers." What, indeed, is left of the hallowed ideal of the
rule of law if the President, like Mussolini, is empowered to direct his
secretaries to "take a law"? 7 Certainly one need not believe with
Judge Vanderbilt that "universal" application of the doctrine of
separation of powers is essential to the preservation of stability and
liberty,s nor even with Dean Pound that judicial review is the one
outstanding American contribution to politics,9 to feel that we are
more secure from tyranny with judicial restraints on the Executive
than without them.
While the Supreme Court has not completely forsaken Bracton's
ancient apothegm that the King is "under the law," 10 it is nonetheless
clear that some accommodation has been made between separation of
powers and the forceful assertion of the judicial power on the one
hand and judicial intervention in the making of international political
decisions on the other.
It is well at the threshold to examine Mr. Justice Jackson's rationale
in the Chicago & Southern case. There are four doctrinal limitations to
this policy of judicial self-restraint in cases involving the international
political decisions of the Executive:
Tim Docinllm oF SEPARATION oF PowERs Am ITs PRESENT-DAY SIG(1953).
7. Chief Justice Marshall asked in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176
(1803):
6. Vam,

mr,

NImCANCE 97-144

To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?
See also, V~aNmDmLT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 34-35.
8. VAD mBT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 144.
9. Pound, The Place of the judiciary in a Democratic Polity, 27 A.B.A.J. 133, 139

(1941).
10. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 n.27 (1952) (concurring opinion).
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1. The rationale of restraint does not bar all judicial determinations
of fact relating to international politics. The courts are free to find
facts in all respects as they relate to questions other than the merit of
the Executive's political decisions; the Executive's fact determination is
not conclusive except with respect to the question of the validity of its
own action or policy. 1 The odium is in upsetting national policy by
second-guessing the better informed Executive.
2. If the Executive states or admits to a particular purpose for its
action which is erroneous or unjustified, the action may be disregarded
as unlawful even though the courts might not otherwise be justified
in probing into the matter. Thus, even though the decisions underlying a course of action might be otherwise closed to re-examination
and even though the Executive's action might therefore be presumed
valid, it may be rendered invalid if the Executive is openly committed
to a wrongful basis for action.'2
3. Where the impropriety of an underlying determination is not an
essential ingredient to a challenge to executive action, the courts are
free to sustain the challenge if it is in other respects convincing. 3 To
the extent that a private citizen can bring his interests within the
umbrella of an absolute prohibition, he is secure from executive encroachments in that the fact context and policy motivations of the
exercise of executive power are there irrelevant. Generally, however,
the executive power will depend for its efficacy upon the circumstances
of its exercise. Occasions for the exercise of this judicial power of last
resort are rare and there is room for considerable bureaucratic brutality
within the confines thus imposed, but it is well to understand that the
outer limits of the penumbra of executive power may be subject to
judicial definition.
11. E.g., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).

The executive de-

cision may be relevant, even where it is not deemed binding on the courts. Bank of
China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59, 64 (N.D. Cal. 1952)
(dictum).

12. The situation may be the same where the Executive is committed by a motion to
dismiss to a wrongful basis for its action. A recent case is Shachtman v. Dulles, 225
F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955). But whether a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging that

executive action was based on a wrongful reason is a sound motion may depend on
the obligation of the Executive to disclose any reason. If no finding is necessary and
the reasons for executive action may remain veiled, then the allegations in such a complaint need not be controverted. See note 73 infra.
13. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
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4. The courts must, of course, determine their own jurisdiction and
to this end the courts must exercise some political judgment in identifying a "political question" as here defined.
We shall now examine in greater detail the sources and character
of the executive power 14 with a view to determining, in the light of
the political question doctrine, the proper juxtaposition of the judicial
power. The Constitution vests the Executive with the following
powers pertinent to its dealings in foreign relations:
(1) the administrative powers exercised by the Executive as the
amanuensis of Congress, including the power to act between
and beyond the express commands of Congress;
(2) the recognition power exercised in the exchange of diplomatic
officials with foreign governments;
(3) the power exercised as commander-in-chief of the army and
navy;
(4) the treaty power exercised in the negotiation of international
agreements.
I
THE FAITHFUL EXECUTION OF THE LAWS

Article HI of the Constitution is made of the most malleable
language; the structure of the presidential office was left in large
measure to future architects. While the courts have given the
broadest interpretation to the express statutory and constitutional
powers of the Executive, they have on occasion departed from the
terms of article II to apply a latitudinarian concept of the presidential
office. The Supreme Court in sustaining executive action, has embraced at times three justifications which are independent of any
sanction expressed either in the Constitution or in a statute.
Chief JusticeTaft once embraced the Hamiltonian interpretation of
15
the "executive power" vested in the President. He took these words
By Hamilton's reading,
to repose substantive powers on the office.'
resembling that of
power
the Presidency was thus imbued with a
14. See CORWIN, TIE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (3d ed. 1948).
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, 5 i.
16. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926). Cf. Mr. Justice Brewer's
analysis of the "judicial power" in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 82 (1907).
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George III, subject only to such limitations as might be imposed by
the subsequent sections of article 11.17 This Trojan Horse has not been
ridden since, but the precedent remains.' s
Of only slightly greater present interest is the doctrine of Mr.

Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.'19
When confronted with the contention that the joint resolution authorizing the Chaco arms embargo constituted an improper delegation
of legislative power, Mr. Justice Sutherland took refuge in broad
statements of the power of the federal government2° and its executive
branch. Insofar as the case holds that the rule of nondelegability has
21
less vitality in the sphere of foreign relations, it seems established law.
But this is of slight importance in view of the present posture of that
doctrine. 2 Of somewhat greater interest is the obiter dicta of "inherent" executive power. The case is often cited for the proposition
that the President has "inherent" power in dealing with problems of
CORwIN, TI-x PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 7-32 (1917).
18. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), sustained the power of the President
to remove a Postmaster in contravention of an act of Congress. This holding was
greatly limited in Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). But cf.
Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941).
Chief Justice Taft's doctrine was given tacit approval in Mathews, The Constitutional
Power of the President to Conclude InternationalAgreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 349-50
(1955), and by the Court in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942), and by Chief
Justice Vinson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 681 (1952)
(dissenting opinion), but it was roundly rejected by Mr. Justice Jackson. Id. at 640-41.
19. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
20. The statements of "inherent" federal power were obiter dicta in that the power
to regulate or restrict international arms shipment could hardly be questioned to exist
under the commerce clause. But some such "inherent" power does seem to exist. See
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter,
J.); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 681 (1889) (upholding power to expel aliens-quaere whether this
power could be assimilated to the foreign commerce power); United States v. Peace
Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951) (upholding power to protect the
government from subversion); cf. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890) (upholding power to claim uninhabited island); see also, Tim FEDERALISr No. 41 (Madison).
21. United States v. Rosenberg, 150 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 752
(1945); United States v. Von Clemm, 136 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
769 (1943); Colonial Airlines, Inc. v. Adams, 87 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1948); United
States v. Bareno, 50 F. Supp. 520 (D. Md. 1943).
22. See United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939).

17. See
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2
foreign relations. But when does such a power find application?"
No court has yet rested a case upon Mr. Justice Sutherland's brave
doctrine, although it has often been used as a buttress. It is never
treated in such terms, but the case seems more accurately taken to
signify only an increased deference to the Executive where it is dealing with problems of foreign relations.
The third basis of executive independence dates from Locke's concept of the executive prerogative 24 and finds implied sanction in the
constitutional power to ". .. take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed .... ",,2' The Executive must tailor the laws of Congress to
meet specific and often unforeseen situations; this obligation gives rise
to a quasi-legislative power, exercisable interstitially, or even in areas
where there has been no congressional action at all.2 6 Since this is a
power to interpolate the "will" of Congress, or to preserve the situation so that Congress will have something left to act upon, 7 it seems
to follow that it is coterminous with the legislative power. s Because

23. It can have application only if we take seriously the implications of the characterizations of the President as the "sole organ of foreign relation." It might then
follow that the President had some power superior to that of Congress within Congress' jurisdiction. Cf. 39 Ops. ATr'Y GEN',. 484, 489 (1940). But cf. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 passim (1952); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 170 (1806).
24. LocKE, OF CIvIL GovFa.RiMENT 199-203 (Everyman's Library 1943).
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, §3.
26. The Executive may invoke the judicial power to protect federal interests without
statutory authorizations. Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925);
Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 147 (1921); United States v. San Jacinto
Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888). This power is limited by the "fiscal function" doctrine. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Gartner v. United
States, 166 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1948). The Executive may remove obstructions to the
flow of interstate or foreign commerce without statutory authorization. In re Debs,
158 U.S. 564 (1895). But cf. United States v. Washington Improvement & Development Co., 189 Fed. 674 (C.C.E.D. Wash. 1911). The Executive may extend the
duties of United States marshals without statutory authorization. In re Neagle, 135
U.S. 1 (1890); cf. United States v. Mullin, 71 Fed. 682 (D. Neb. 1895). The power is
not limited to emergencies; the Executive's actions, like those of an agent, may be
tacitly ratified by the silence of Congress. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U.S. 459 (1915). Probably the Executive is entitled to extra deference in the area of
foreign relations.
27. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 704 (1952) (dissenting
opinion of Vinson, C.J.).
28. A similar power may be appended to the treaty power, but as this may rest on
a somewhat different basis, we shall consider it in connection with the treaty power.
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it is an "emergency power," 29 it is often used jointly in some confusion

with the President's power as commander-in-chief to justify executive action."' This executive power may be at fullest bloom in areas
where Congress has taken no action; it is then easier to sustain the
supposition that Congress did not foresee the problem at hand. This
leaves the Executive free for its own implementations of policy.

Some helpful illumination was shed on this last point during the
controversy concerning the landing of submarine cables.

President

Grant refused to permit the landing of a cable by a French company
in 1872 and informed Congress of his action; this practice was repeated several times31 and was upheld by a district court in 18962
and by Attorney General Richards in 1898. 33 In 1921, the same
power was exerted against the Western Union Company, which had
been attempting to connect with a British cable running from Brazil
to the Caribbean. The Navy prevented the landing of the Western
Union cable in Florida and the Attorney General then sought to enjoin both the landing of the new cable and the receiving of messages
sent over the British cable through Western Union's old facilities in
Cuba. Judge Augustus Hand denied the injunction 34 on the ground
that Western Union, as a domestic corporation, had been otherwise
29. Chief Justice Hughes defined the relationship between emergency and "power":
While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion
for the exercise of power. "Although an emergency may not call into life a
power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for
the exertion of a living power already enjoyed." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
30. See United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.), dismissed as moot, 326 U.S. 690 (1945) (upholding seizure of wholesale business); 30
Ops. Aary GEN. 291 (1914) (upholding seizure of wireless station). But cf. Durand
v. Hollins, 4 Blatch. 451 (2d Cir. 1860), where the power of the Executive to employ
naval forces to protect American citizens in Nicaragua was defended as an exercise
of the executive prerogative.
31. See CORwiN, Tim PRESIDENT: OIcE Am PowFRs 239 (3d ed. 1948).
32. United States v. La Compagnie Francaise Des Cables Telegraphiques, 77 Fed.
495 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896). Judge Lacombe said:
...
[W]ithout the consent of the general government, no one, alien or native,
has any right to establish a physical connection between the shores of this
country and that of any foreign nation. Such consent may be implied as well as
expressed, and whether it shall be granted or implied is a political question,
which, in the absence of congressional action, would seem to fall within the
province of the executive to decide. Id. at 496.
33. 22 Ors. ATT'Y GEN. 13 (1898).
34. United States v. Western Union Tel. Co., 272 Fed. 311 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per
curiam, 272 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd by stipulation, 260 U.S. 754 (1922).
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regulated by Congress, and was entitled to engage in the activities in
question by virtue of the Post Roads Act of 1866"5 and the company's
congressional franchise passed the same year36 and hence, that Congress
had effectively "filled the field," barring unauthorized executive action.
Judge Hand said:
It is argued that in spite of the Act of July 24, 1866, and the Interstate Commerce Act, by which certain features of defendant's business may be regulated, and although both acts apparently cover telegraphic business originating in this country and destined for foreign
countries, yet the power of the Executive remains to prevent a domestic corporation for many years engaged under a federal franchise in a
foreign cable business from making new cable connections. It may be
that the President, before Congress has acted, may exercise this power
in respect to a foreign cable company having no congressional franchise. This is claimed to have been substantially the situation in the
case of the French Cable Company, decided by Judge Lacombe.
But in respect to the Western Union, which by the Act of July 24,
1866... possesses a federal franchise covering a business with foreign
countries and regulated as to rates by an agency of the Government
created by Congress, it seems unreasonable to hold that Congress has
not occupied the field and legislated so generally in regard to this defendant that it has withdrawn it from the exercise of executive power
in respect to foreign cable connections.37
Judge Hand's opinion was prophetic of the recent Steel Seizure
Case.33 Little purpose would be served by recounting the facts of
that case which are familiar to all, or by another exhaustive analysis
of the opinions.3 9 It is sufficient for our purpose to observe that in
the doctrine of executive power which was urged upon it, the
Supreme Court saw a headless horseman. Like Ichabod Crane, the
Court rode off in all directions at once. A significant thread of
concord ran through all of the seven separate opinions on this point,
that the power of Congress in its legislative domain is superior to any
power of the Executive. Congress could prevent or forbid the seizure
35. Post-Roads Act, c. 230, 14 STAT. 221 (1866).
36. Act of May 5, 1866, c. 74, 14 STAT. 44.
37. United States v. Western Union Tel Co., 272 Fed. 311, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
38. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
39. See Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53
CoLUm. L. REv. 53 (1953); Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, The President
and the Supreme Court, 51 MIcu. L. REv. 141 (1952).

Virginia Law Review

184

[Vol. 42

of the steel mills; the controversy on the bench went to the effect to
be given the expressions of Congress on the subject and also to the
question whether the President had any power at all in the premises,
even absent the legislation. It now seems clear, if it was not before, 0
that Congress has always the stronger hand within its legislative
domain.
When Congress does not act, the courts can serve as only a limited
check on the Executive. The Executive possesses circumstantial
power. Where the circumstances are international and the action
political, the primary conceptual limitation on this power of the
Executive, viz., that its exercise must be justified by the circumstances,
is largely unenforceable. Where foreign relations are involved, the
courts can intervene only where Congress or the Constitution expressly or implicitly forbids the Executive's action without regard to
the circumstances. With regard to independent executive invasions
of the personal sanctuaries of the Constitution, there are no decided
cases, but it would seem that the protection accorded personal rights
should not be impaired by the absence of the congressional sanction.
Thus the cases limiting Congress' power to restrict personal rights are
at least as applicable to the executive power.4 '
It is against this setting of executive independence that Congress
legislates. When Congress acts, the problem of judicial review becomes subject to a new dimension. The existence and scope of the
judicial function is then in large measure defined by Congress. Exten42
sive though the power of Congress over the federal courts may be,
there are both maximum and minimum limits on the extent of the
judicial restraints which Congress may provide.
Congress may not require the courts to decide questions which are
not justiciable within the purview of article III. 43 It is traditional
that policy-making discretion cannot be vested in the courts; a judge
40. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) *169 (1804), setting aside seizure of a

ship in violation of implied congressional prohibition. The case was relied upon by
Mr. Justice Clark in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 660
(1952)

(concurring opinion).

41. It is probably of no significance, but the first amendment applies by its terms
only to Congress.
42. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co.,
303 U.S. 323 (1938); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Sheldon v.
Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
43: See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (concurring opinion of
Brandeis, J.).
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cannot substitute his judgment for that of the executive officer who
wields discretionary power.4
Only when Congress imposes a "ministerial" duty upon the Executive can the courts set aside his action
for the slightest misfeasance. 45 Where the Executive is to exercise discretion, the judicial power can be asserted only upon a finding of
abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious action as when the
Executive's decision is supported by insufficient evidence. 4 And where
the situation in which the discretion is exercised is of an international
political nature, even this review is constitutionally foreclosed.
This is demonstrated in the judicial review of Civil Aeronautics
Board certification proceedings.
Where the route in question is
domestic, the courts may properly inquire whether the Board's decision as to which of the competing carriers will best serve the public
interest is supported by substantial evidence, or whether the Board
has abused its discretion.4 7 But where the route involved reaches to
foreign terminals, international considerations are germaine; as the
executive action embodies an international political decision, it is
beyond judicial scrutiny. Upon this last point, the Supreme Court
48
was in full agreement in the Chicago & Southern case.
Similar is the judicial review of the Executive's administration of
the immigration laws. The federal courts have reviewed executive
discretion embodied in orders denying aliens enlargement for bail,4 9
fixing bail,5° denying admission of aliens under bond,5 denying sus44. See FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952); Federal Radio Commission v.
General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S.
428 (1923).
45. See e.g., Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83 (1945).
46. See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197
(1938).
47. United Air Lines v. CAB, 155 F.2d 109, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (dictum); cf. Delta
Air Lines v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74 (1954).
48. Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). See also
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 184 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 941
(1951); Pan American Airways Co. v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941).
49. United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1954);
United States ex rel. Young v. Shaughnessy, 194 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1952); United States
ex rel. De Geronimi v. Shaughnessy, 187 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
50. United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1948);
Yarnish v. Phelan, 86 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
51. United States ex rel. Ickowicz v. Day, 18 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1927).
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pension of deportation,5' or denying the aliens permission to leave the
country voluntarily.53 The scope of this review has been very narrow.
Judge Learned Hand said in United States ex rel. Kaloudis v.
Shaughnessy5 4 that:
. [U]nless the ground stated is on its face insufficient, [the alien]
..must accept the decision, for it was made in the "exercise of discretion," which we have again and again declared that we will not
review.55
*

.

Judge Hand suggested that review would be available if suspension
of deportation was denied because the alien had become addicted to
baseball or had bad table manners. Such a reason would be so clearly
irrelevant that the court could find a transgression of the legislative command. Thus, an order resting upon an inference of moral turpitude
drawn from the alien's exercise of the self incrimination privilege was set
aside as an abuse of discretion.5, 6 But, where the Executive introduces
any plausible basis for the order, the inquiry is closed.57
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 authorized the Attorney General to withhold deportation to a country in which, in his
opinion, the alien would be subject to physical persecution."8 The
Second Circuit has held the exercise of this discretion to be wholly
beyond reach of judicial scrutiny; the considerations involved relate to
international politics and are not suited to judicial inquiry. 59 The
52. United States ex rel. Brzovich v. Holton, 222 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1955); United

States ex rel. Adel v. Shaughnessy, 183 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1950); United States ex Tel.
Knauff v. McGrath, 181 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1950), dismissed as moot, 340 U.S. 940
(1951); United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950);

United States ex rel. Weddecke v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 876 (1948); United States ex rel. McLeod v. Garfinkel, 129 F. Supp. 591 (WD.

Pa. 1955).
53. United States ex rel Frangoulis v. Shaughnessy, 210 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1954);

United States ex rel. Bartsch v. Watkins, 75 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1949); United States
ex rel. Salvetti v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1939); cf. United States ex rel. Mazur
v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1939).

54. United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950).
55. Id. at 490.
56. See United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1954).
57. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
McGrath, 181 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1950) (concurring opinion of Learned Hand, J.).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1952).

59. United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 928 (1953); cf. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
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court can ascertain that the executive officer has, in fact, decided the
question;0 but there is no benchmark by which to judge the reasonableness of the decision. 1
Here the paradox arises. Where the private interest is one within
the cognizance of the due process clause, the Constitution requires
that any impingement thereof shall be "reasonable" or colorably responsive to the circumstances in which the impingement occurs.
But the Constitution also requires that the courts shall not, even at
the direction of Congress, determine the reasonableness of the offensive executive action where foreign policy judgment is involved.
The constitutional right is then non-Hohfeldian to say the least.
The courts might have sought to resolve the dilemma by weighing
the relative importance of the particular private interest involved
against the need for judicial restraint in each case. While this
would be ordinary judicial technique, it would evade the thrust of
the political question rationale; not only the merits of the underlying
executive decision, but also the extent of the need for judicial restraint
in any particular case involving such a decision are imponderables
which cannot be fully appreciated by the judiciary. A very severe
case in point is Ludecke v. Watkins. 2 In that case the Supreme Court
declined to review executive determinations that Germany was an
enemy nation in 1948 and that Mr. Ludecke, a German national, was
"dangerous." He was subject to deportation without the protections
of the due process clause to which aliens are ordinarily entitled. 3
The executive decision was there plainly erroneous, and it is difficult
to imagine that a contrary decision would have handicapped or
embarrassed the nation's foreign policy in any appreciable way. But
an appraisal of the degree of danger latent in judicial interference
60. Lim Fong v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1954); cf. Mahler v. Eby, 264
U.S. 32 (1924); United States ex rel. Di Paola v. Reimer, 102 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1939).
61. There appears to be a similar limit on the extent to which Congress can withdraw administrative action from judicial review. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAv 85665, 918-22 (1951); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953).
62. 335 U.S. 160 (1948). Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge J.J., dissented in
this case.
63. The right of the friendly alien to the protections of substantive due process of
law was acknowledged in Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) (dictum);
cf. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. 33 (1950); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920). In the Ludeckecase, the alien asserted a right to notice and hearing; this being denied, it would seem
to follow a fortiori that substantive due process protections are unavailing.

Virginia Law Reiew[

[Vol. 42

requires political acumen with which the courts are not equipped. 4
The answer to the paradox appears to be that the Constitution is
addressed to officials other than judges; the Constitution contemplates
that the Executive as well as the judiciary shall be charged with the
protection of the "rights" created.
There are nevertheless occasions for judicial restraint upon the
Executive's international activities. Questions relating to the Executive's procedures may in some cases be determined with no violence
to the political question doctrine. Returning to the Chicago &
Southern case, the Board ruling which was not reviewed was infected
by the power of revocation and modification conferred upon the
President by the statute. The majority of the Court held that the
presidential order adopting the Board ruling was not reviewable and
that, despite statutory provisions for review, the Board ruling itself
could not be reviewed seriatim because it was advisory and not final
within the purview of the ancient rule of Hayburn's Case.65 Four
justices dissented 6 on the ground that the Board action was separable.
In writing the dissenting opinion, 67 Mr. Justice Douglas suggested that
a logical application of the Court's holding would incapacitate the
Court for review of the Board's faithfulness to procedural requirements, as well as for review of its discretionary judgment on the
evidence. 8 If the Board denied an interested party the notice and
64. This question requires a quantitative analysis which is to be distinguished from
the qualitative analysis made by the courts in the initial identification of the political
question raised.
65. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). U.S. CONST. art. III, requires that the exercise of
the judicial power must be final and binding on the parties. and not be subject to
amendment. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851); Hayburn's Case,
supra.
66. Black, Douglas, Reed, and Rutledge, J.J.
67. Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103, 114 (1948).
68. The same problems may also arise under the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.
1 1351 (1952), which authorizes the President to make limited changes in duty rates.
The Supreme Court held the exercise of this power to be beyond review, even where
the importer alleged an abuse of administrative discretion in translating production
cost from Japanese yen to dollars at an exchange rate based upon an arbitrarily
chosen base period. United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940). The
Court employed language contrary to the traditional notion that the substantiality of
the evidence or the limits of administrative discretion are questions of law which a
court may decide. Id. at 380. Although the opinion is not clear in this respect, it
would seem that the practical considerations which silently moved the Court to deny
review are very similar to those stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in the Chicago 6
Southern case. Much of the probative evidence before the Executive might be un-
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hearing required by statute, could the courts not set aside the subsequent presidential order on the ground that the Executive, having
failed to comply with the statutory condition precedent, had no power

to decide the question improperly put before him?°9

There will be some cases in which no imaginable circumstances
could justify the arbitrary procedure employed by the Executive,70

but otherwise it is doubtful that a court could properly impose such
procedural requirements as an application of the due process clause.
The due process clause requires only a reasonable procedure under
the circumstances, and, if the circumstances are inscrutable, a nonjusticiable question is raised. 71 But, where the requirements are imposed by Congress, an ultimate question of power is raised which can
always be decided without regard to the circumstances.7 2
We have reserved for consideration the problems faced by the

courts in identifying the political character of questions raised. In the
course of determining their jurisdiction, the courts must determine
whether the challenged executive action embodies political judgment.
Is it enough that there is a possibility that the Executive may have

exercised political judgment? The point was not discussed directly by
Mr. Justice Jackson in the Chicago & Southern case. The parties in
that case did not suggest, however, that the particular presidential
order in question did in fact embody any judgment other than a

purely negative judgment that the CAB certification would not be
available to the Court, and the President might well consider the political consequences
of the increased duty in making his decision. The report of the Tariff Commission is
similar to the certification of the Civil Aeronautics Board in that neither agency passes
on secret evidence and neither makes political decisions in the constitutional dialectic,
but the decisions of both agencies are subject to the approval of the President who
makes the political decisions. It would seem that the courts should be able to set
aside the tariff modification by the President for failure to maintain the procedural
standards required by statute, if Congress so provided with sufficient clarity.
69. Mr. Justice Cardozo in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), said:
If legislative power is delegated subject to a condition, it is a requirement of
constitutional government that the condition be fulfilled. Id. at 448.
70. See, e.g., Nathan v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1955); Clark v. Dulles, 129
F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
These cases held that persons seeking passports are entitled to notice and hearing prior
to the exercise by the State Department of its discretion under the Passport Act, 22
U.S.C. § 211a (1952). The brief opinions, however, did not acknowledge the political
character of the executive act.
71. See note 64 supra.
72. See note 13 supra.
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harmful to our relations with Cuba. The Court was apparently satisfied by the possibility, however remote, that the President considered
matters which might not be properly scrutinized by it. It is possible
that, at least where constitutionally protected interests are involved,
the courts shoud probe further. The Executive surely cannot be under
constitutional compulsion to give full disclosure of its reasons since this
would abuse the constitutional desideratum of secrecy. But should not
the injured individual have a judicially enforceable right to a rationalization for his abuse?7 3 The Executive might be required to state at
least that his action embodied political judgment. This would provide an honor system check on the Executive and permit judicial
relief in cases where such relief might otherwise be needlessly withdrawn. A public statement would also give the individual a better
opportunity to focus public opinion on his situation and thereby
exploit the political check on the Executive. Even such a limited
disclosure might, however, have serious consequences in some cases
and it is doubtful that the courts will, as a matter of the constitutional
right of the individual, thus invade the executive domain. It is nevertheless clear that Congress, where its power is dominant, can require
the Executive to make findings of any kind and the courts may prop73. This question may arise soon in the context of the passport cases. The State
Department has been accustomed to denying or revoking passports, assigning as the
reason that the proposed trip would not be in the "best interests" of the United States.
Despite the possible contrary implications of the cases cited in note 70 supra, and in
Schachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955), see note 12 supra, it would
seem that political judgment is involved in the exercise of the State Department's
discretion and that the "best interests" passport refusal is immune from review for
substantive error. For the contrary view and the background of the problem, see
Notes, Passport Refusal for Political Reasons, 61 YALE LJ. 171 (1952); Passport
Denied, 3 STAN. L. REv. 312 (1951).

The Yale notewriter is particularly convincing,

in saying that the State Department practice is less than responsive to the needs of
a democratic society. In his case for judicial review, the notewriter is successful
in rebutting the State Department's contention that its rulings are political because
of the ancient function of the passport in entitling the bearer to protection by our
government; it is true that the modem function of the passport is rather to restrict the freedom of movement of the individual. But it is here suggested that the
function of the passport is not controlling as to reviewability; the factor which does
control reviewability is the character of the considerations underlying the passport
refusal. It is surely true that the United States is closely identified in the minds of
foreign residents with the tourists we send abroad; there is nothing remiss in Congress
authorizing the Secretary of State to deny egress to citizens who will antagonize our
friends and allies in the current struggle. And a decision as to which applicants for
passports are likely to antagonize must necessarily embody a political prophecy and a
finding of fact which the courts cannot properly or adequately reappraise.
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erly enforce such requirements as conditions precedent to the lawful
exercise of executive power in the same manner as other procedural
requirements imposed by Congress may be enforced.
The extent to which the courts can act as an effective check on the
Executive exercising its administrative powers is thus largely in the
hands of Congress. Congress can limit the scope of application of the
political question doctrine by requiring the Executive to identify those
acts which are political and, most importantly, Congress can impose
the procedural safeguards that in practice may be more crucial to the
individual than the substantive standards which the courts, in this
sphere, are wholly debilitated from enforcing.
II
THE REcoGNIrioN POWER

The recognition power arises from the President's constitutional
authority to appoint the emissaries of the United States' 4 and to receive
the emissaries of other countries. 75 The judiciary has from the beginning avoided transgression of the Executive's recognition policy,
and the executive decisions have been characterized as political and
beyond the reach of judicial review76 The unrecognized government
has been denied access to our courts.77 The courts have been bound
by executive practice in determining questions relating to international
boundaries, 78 the diplomatic immunity to be accorded foreign representatives, 79 or the sovereign immunity accorded foreign governments.80
74. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
75. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
76. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941); OetJen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297 (1918); Williams v. The Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839);
cf. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253 (1829).

77. Republic of China v. Merchants' Fire Assur. Corp., 30 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1929);
Russian Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923); cf. Russia v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 293 Fed. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (permitting suit by the Kerensky government).
78. Jones v. United States, supra note 77; Williams v. The Suffolk Ins. Co., supra
note 77. But see Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); Fuchs, Administrative Determinationsand Personal Rights in the Present Supreme Court, 24 IND.
L.J. 163 (1949).
79. In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890); United States v. Liddle, 26 Fed. Cas. 936, No.
15598 (C.C. Wash. 1808); Trost v. Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226, 229 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1945) (dictum).
80. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Compania Espanola v. Nevemar, 303 U.S.
68, 74 (1938) (dictum).
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With regard to these questions, the courts have practiced remarkable
self-restraint. Judicial deference has extended so far as to respect
executive requests in the deciding of specific cases involving foreign
governments or their activities.8 1 Where the Executive "recognizes
and allows" a claim of sovereign immunity, the courts conform to

that policy.8a
The recognition power was given unexpected scope in the litigation
arising from the Litvinov Agreement of 1933. Prior to the recognition effected by that agreement, the nationalization decrees of the
Soviet government had quite naturally been dishonored as to property
situated in this country."' And thereafter it had been assumed that
the Russian decrees could at best reach only such property as might
be within the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R. 4 But in United States v.
Belmont,8 5 the Supreme Court held that the United States, as assignee
of the U.S.S.R. under the Litvinov Agreement, might recover the New
81. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); The Beaton
Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946); Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942); Hassard v. Mexico, 29 Misc. 511
'(Sup. Ct.); affd 'vwtbout opinion, 46 App. Div. 623, 61 N.Y. Supp. 939 (1st Dep't
1899), aff'd me-z., 173 N.Y. 645, 66 N.E. 1110 (1903). Even in the absence of such a
request, the courts have sometimes indicated a desire for a specific declaration of executive policy. Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 91 N.J.L.
382, 103 At. 397 (1918); see The Attualita, 238 Fed. 909 (4th Cir. 1916); United States
v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gessellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
82. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). Compania Espanola v. Navemar, 303 U.S.
68, 74 (1938) (dictum). The Executive's policy has been inferred in the absence of a
specific ruling or request. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941); The Maliakos, 41 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);
American Tobacco Co. v. The oannis P. Goulandris, 40 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y.
1941); Miller v. Ferrocarrill del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 18 A.2d 688
(1941). Where the Executive has indicated hostility, the immunity has been denied.
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); see Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
281 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E.2d 81 (1939). But cf. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S.
377, 390 (1938) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.).
83. The courts had occasionally been compelled to give some effect to the decrees
as a begrudging de facto recognition. See M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262
N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933); cf. McCarthy v. Reichsbank, 259 App. Div. 1016, 20
N.Y.S.2d 450 (2d Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 284 N.Y. 739, 31 N.E.2d 508 (1940).
84. See Vladikavkazky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456
Other courts have denied extraterritorial effect to such decrees despite
(1934).
diplomatic recognition. Boguslawski v. Gydnia Ameryka Linie, [1951] 1 K.B. 162
(C.A. 1950); Laane and Baltser v. Estonian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line, [1949]
Can. Sup. Ct. 530, 2 O.L.R. 641; cf. Barclay v. Russell, 3 Ves. Jr. 424, 30 Eng. Rep.
1087 (Ch. 1797).
85. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).

1956]

Political Questions

York funds of a Russian corporation from the stakeholder. Mr.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, explained that recognition
of the Soviet government was binding on the courts and constituted
a retroactive validation of its actions from the commencement of its
existenceS8 The effect to be given to the decree in question was
deemed a proper subject for diplomatic negotiation; hence, federal
policy, as expressed in the agreement, should control. A local policy
against confiscation could not prevail to clog the machinery for establishing amicable relations with a foreign power given to the practice
of confiscation. 7
An additional complication arose in United States v. Pink,"" where
the United States, as assignee, sought to reach the nationalized assets
of a Russian insurance company held by the New York Insurance
Commissioner. Pursuant to a decree by the New York Court of
Appeals, 9 the Commissioner had paid local creditors of the company
from these assets and was preparing to pay foreign creditors as well
when the United States intervened to claim the balance. The Supreme
Court resisted the contention that the foreign creditors were deprived
of property without due process of lawY0 The basis of the decision
on this point is not altogether clear from the enigmatic opinions of the
Court. But apparently the Court viewed the "vesting" of the interest
as merely a manifestation of the local policy against confiscation which
had succumbed to the national policy expressed by the Executive.
The Court's approach to the claimants' contention does not seem to
suggest that the fifth amendment is wholly inapplicable as a limitation
upon such executive action. 91
86. Id. at 328. Nonrecognition has been given effect in denying recognition of
such actions. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Lines v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1951); The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944); The Signe, 39 F. Supp. 810
(E.D. La. 1941), affd sub norn. The Florida, 133 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nonz. Tiedemann v. Estoduras S.S. Co., 319 U.S. 774 (1943); The Regent, 35 F. Supp.
985 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); The Kotkas, 35 F. Supp. 983 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
87. Similar decrees have since been honored in more amicable circumstances. See
Chemacid, S.A. v. Ferrotar Corp., 51 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1943; Anderson v. N.V.
Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 NE.2d 502 (1942).
88. 315 U.S. 203 (1941).
89. People v. Russian Reinsurance Co., 255 N.Y. 415, 175 N.E. 114 (1931).
90. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1941). Local creditors held no
better position. Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co., 58 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1944),
modified on other grounds, 161 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 807 (1947);
United States v. New York Trust Co., 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
91. The Bricker Amendment enthusiasts read the Pink case otherwise. See, e.g.,
Sc-wvppi2, TREATIEs AND ,xEcurvE AGREEmENs (1953).
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Rather it would seem that the Executive's recognition power is
subject to a minimal judicial limitation. The Constitution has no application to the actions of foreign governments and the courts cannot
re-examine the Executive's recognition policy. But seemingly the
Executive cannot expose private interests to destruction when the interests involved have a vitality which is independent of the sort of
policy considerations prevalent in the Pink case. There the interests
of the foreign creditors were bottomed upon the New York policy
against confiscation. This policy effected an intrusion into the relation of the Russian government to its nationals; this being a problem
susceptible to diplomatic solution, the Supreme Court deemed it more
appropriately controlled by national policy. If the creditors had
obtained judgment and levied on the property prior to the Soviet
decree, the case would bear a different complexion. Their interests
would not then be wholly dependent upon the local policy of dishonoring confiscatory decrees and the local law would seem to afford
a more substantial basis for the assertion of a vested right. This
notion may be extended to a clearer case. The Executive surely
could not validate seizure of the steel mills by taking an assignment of
them from the Canadian government. The executive recognition of a
Canadian confiscation decree cannot be effective to divest American
citizens of their rights in American property.92 These latter rights have
vitality independent of the general policy against confiscation. To
this extent, at least, the courts seem to be capable of restraining the
Executive's recognition power.
However this may be, the courts are increasingly wary of any interference with the diplomatic establishment in its determination of
questions of recognition? 3 To an increasing extent, the jural status
of the acts of foreign governments is subjected to executive determination. And while the President has on occasion called for legislative
ratification of recognition policy,9 4 Congress has never challenged
executive pre-eminence; hence the legislative check, if any, is of untested strength.
92. The United States took the Litvinov claims subject to existing statutes of limitations and setoff rights. United States v. National City Bank, 90 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (setoff); United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 52 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), ree'd on other grounds, 147 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1945) (statute of limitations).
It is doubtful that the result could have been otherwise.
93. See JAFFE, JUDIcrAL AsPEm op FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933); Note, Judicial Deference to the State Department on InternationalLegal Issues, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 79 (1948).
94. CoRwrN, THE PammsENr: OFFicE AND Powmts 224-35 (3d. ed. 1948).
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III
THE ExEcuTIvE's POWER AS THE

COMMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Of the powers of the Executive, the command of the army and
navy9 5 is least susceptible to judicial limitation. The considerations
compelling judicial restraint reach the apex of their persuasiveness
when the challenged executive action is military. It is not possible
in the limits of this article to give careful scrutiny to all the many
facets of the problem of defining the courts' relation to the military
and their tribunals, even though military action may well be of the
direst consequence both to our foreign relations and to the private
interests of the citizenry. "" Aside from the problem of judicial substitution of judgment, which has been the subject of this discourse,
the courts face other problems in dealing with the military. All
reckoning must begin with the constitutional fact of life that the
President can ignore the judiciary altogether if he chooses to assert
the military force at his command. History teaches that in time of
97
peril the nation as a whole gives scant attention to judicial utterances.
At such times there is little for the courts to do but stand back and
hold the coats. Being powerless in fact, they have generally chosen to
be powerless in law.9 8 There are in addition territorial jurisdictional
problems as to how far the courts can follow the flag. 99
In a few cases the courts have undertaken the awesome task of
checking military power,810 but the judicial check is generally a shadow
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

96. See CoRwi,

op. cit. supra note 94, c. 3; RossiTER, TE Su iurm CouRT AND THE
PowEms op mm PRESIDENT, Senate Foreign

CONINMANDER IN CHIEF (1951); REPORT ON

Relations and Armed Services Committee, 82d Cong. (1951).
97. When Chief Justice Taney asserted the rule of law in the trenches, his protestations fell on deaf ears. Ex parte Merryman 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9487 (C.C. Md. 1861).
98. RossiTER, op. cit. supra note 96, at 126-32.
99. E.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.

763 (1950); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948). In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(1946). See Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag,
1 Sr. L. REv. 587 (1949).
100. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1886). Both cases held that the Executive could not, without the sanction
of Congress, subject private citizens to a military trial in cases not deemed by the
Court to be within the theatre of military operations. At the time of both decisions
the respective wars were safely over. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
243 (1864). The cases do not square with the Court's persistent refusal to review
executive determinations as to when a war ends. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S.
160, 170 (1948); Note, Judicial Determination of the End of the War, 47 COLum.
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of moral suasion. Congress controls the wellspring of military power;
the Executive's use of it is otherwise restrainable only by the ballot
box and the history book.
Despite their helpless posture, however, a function remains to the
courts. It may be helpful here to distinguish the powers of the
commander-in-chief from the Executive's circumstantial prerogative
implied in the "faithful execution" clause. To be sure, the courts have
shrunk from definitive statements of either source of power. They
often use both, jointly, alternatively, or in confusion.' °' There has
been a tendency to attribute the wartime increase in the Executive's
civilian power to the role of commander-in-chief. This seems unduly
confusing. The executive prerogative is coterminus with the vast "war
power" of Congress; 1 2 it rises from the exigencies of the moment and
is, by definition, ample to fill the need for executive war power over
civilian matters. The Executive may call upon the military personnel
at its command to implement decisions made in the exercise of the
executive prerogative, but this does not immunize such decisions from
the judicial scrutiny otherwise accorded. Where the blade is turned
inward and the military acts within the legislative domain of Congress
in contravention of legislative policy, the courts are likely to assert
themselves on the side of Congress. 1 3 There is no need for military
L. REv. 255 (1947). It would seem as appropriate to determine whether the fighting
has ceased as to locate the fighting. Cf. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543
(1924).
101. E.g., United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.), remanded with directions to dismiss as moot, 326 U.S. 690 (1945).
102. The war power of Congress has rested upon varying rationales. See, e.g.,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 54 (1795); TnE FEDmRALIsT No. 23 (Hamilton). Extensive exercise of power
by Congress during wartime has been upheld on one theory or another in Cities Service
Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952) (power over enemy property); Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (renegotiation); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414 (1944) (price regulation); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (internment of citizens); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1942) (curfew);
Northern Pac. R.R. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919) (seizure of property);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (restraints on speech); McKinley v.
United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919) (suppression of houses of prostitution in military
areas); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 457 (1871). But cf. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81
(1921) (price regulation statute set aside).
103. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) *169 (1804); United States v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
272 Fed. 311 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 272 Fed. 893 (2d Cir.), rev'd on consent of parties, 260
U.S. 754 (1922).
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acumen to decide such an ultimate question of power, and though
still wanting in physical power to enforce their judgments, the courts'
political power is augmented by that of Congress, whose dominions
they defend.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the substantive individual rights provided by the Constitution are largely ineffectual against the power of
the Executive when it is dealing with the problems of foreign relations.
And this is more certainly true when the executive policy is implemented by the military services.0 4 The difficulty of enforcement is then
added to the difficulty of substituting the courts' judgment for that of
the Executive. Furthermore, even though there may be a right to
hearing and notice prior to a passport revocation,0 it is impossible to
imagine such a constitutional requirement being imposed on the military. The courts do hear jurisdictional pleas from those incarcerated
by the military 0 6 and Ex parte Milliga' 07 and Duncan v. Kahanamoku'08 remain as precedents for judicial reconsideration of an
executive decision to displace civil courts with military. But even
these meek trumpets fade to muteness during time of war. Armed
with congressional limitations on the military, the courts can assist
in the protection of private rights, but the courts are too fragile a
bulwark standing alone.

IV

THE TREATY PowER
Despite the impassioned debate of recent years, the treaty power is
probably the most easily defined of the executive powers. In negotiating treaties, the Executive represents the entire nation and not the
federal government alone. Hence, the limitations on federal power
set forth in article I and the tenth amendment are inapplicable to
104. Short of trial by ordeal, there could be no more complete devastation of
"rights" than that which befell Japanese-Americans in 1942. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Executive was there buttressed by Congressional
approval.
105. See note 70 supra.
106. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950); Mullan v. United States, 212 U.S. 516
(1909); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886).
107. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
108. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
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the treaty power exercised by the Executive and the Senate.""9 It is
generally agreed that a valid treaty, as the "supreme law of the land"
prevails over any prior statutes. The validity of a treaty can thus be
challenged only as a violation of a personal guarantee of the Constitution." °
The political question doctrine has never been invoked in such a
matter, but it would seem that the courts are not more capable of
judging the reasonableness of policy decisions because they are embodied in a treaty. The vindication of personal rights abridged by a
treaty is consequently limited in cases requiring the reappraisal of executive policy. Wholly arbitrary procedures established by treaty may
be stricken by the courts and such restrictions as are imposed by the
Senate may, of course, be implemented; otherwise judicial relief is rare.
The effective check on the Executive's treaty power is in the hands of
the Senate which must ratify the treaty.
109. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Herein lies the controversy that
has raged about Senator Bricker's famous "which clause". The present proposal,
S. Jou . 1, 84th Cong. 1955, would limit the treaty power to the confines of article I.
The argument for the amendment rests on the incongruity of permitting the President
and the Senate to do what Congress cannot do. The defense of the present arrangement is based on the practical need of a single national voice in foreign affairs. In
view of the scope of congressional power under article I, the residue of power in
question is rather insignificant and hardly worth the energy expended on it.
110. There seems to be little basis for the doubts of Bricker amenders that these
guarantees limit the treaty power in the same manner as any other power of the
federal government. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), the Supreme
Court did hold Virginia debtors twice liable on the same debts by operation of the
Peace Treaty of 1783. But the Court has often stated that the treaty power is not a
carte blanche, and it has applied to treaties the familiar rule of construction requiring
avoidance of constitutional issues if a fair reading of the treaty permits. See United
States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32 (1869);
Prevost v. Grenaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1856); New Orleans v. United States, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836); United States v. Marks, 4 F.2d 420 (S.D. Tex. 1925);
United States v. Fuld Store Co., 262 Fed. 836 (D. Mont. 1920). Chief Justice Taney,
in the notorious Dred Scott case, set aside the Missouri Compromise Act implementing
the Louisiana Purchase Treaty of 1803 as a violation of the fifth amendment. Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For substantiating dicta, see Asakura v.
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (dictum); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889)
(dictum); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870) (dictum); Doe
v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (dictum). But see Pink v. United
State, 315 U.S. 203 (1941). The present Supreme Court has not had occasion to
express itself on the question. For a discussion of the cases up to Pink, see CowrEs,
And see Sutherland, Restricting the
TeEAaS mm CoNsnTONAL LAW (1941).
Treaty Power, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1305 (1952).
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Executive action peripheral to the negotiation of treaties has been
upheld by the courts on a number of occasions. It is unlikely that the
Executive has any prerogative to act outside the legislative jurisdiction
where no treaty has "filled the field" which might compare with the
circumstantial prerogative already considered. Outside the legislative
jurisdiction there is no congressional corrective power to justify
sustaining interim executive action. The courts could and probably
would hold that the Executive has no quasi-legislative power whatever
in such premises. But the Executive does have power to declare a
treaty lapsed."1 Its judgment as to the survival of a treaty after the
outbreak of war or extinction of a signatory is deemed binding on the
courts." 2
Of much greater significance has been the appendage to the treaty
What is encompassed
power of a loosely defined "agreement power.""'
by this power has been left entirely to imagination, but it has become
fashionable to equate executive agreements with treaties as the "supreme law of the land" without explanation as to how any particular
agreement got that way. The confusion seems to have been sired by
the opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Belmont case, where he
treated the Litvinov Agreement as a treaty, taking no pause to explain
this equation in the terms of the Constitution. It has been suggested
that an agreement power is inferred from article I, section 10, which
denies to the States the power to enter into treaties and other agreements with foreign nations." 4 This is an improvement perhaps on
Mr. Justice Sutherland's complete failure of rationalization, but like
Chief Justice Taft's contribution to the "executive power" clause in
Myers v. United States,"" it is well beyond the pale of liberal constitutional construction. It is obvious that there can often be no peace
treaty without an armistice agreement, and that some executive agreements are essential to the conduct of foreign relations. But it is not
clear why such a preliminary agreement should become municipal law
simply by virtue of its bilateralness. Certainly it reduces the Senate
111. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).

112. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954); Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784, No.

13799 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. 481 (1862).
113. See Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345 (1955).
114. Mathews, supra note 113, at 351.
115. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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ratification requirement to an absurdity if the agreement power has the
same breadth as the treaty power."-6 It would seem sounder and more
in accord with a reasonable construction to rest executive agreements
on the other executive powers severally; surely these other powers are
sufficient to the need. It does no violence to the Constitution to say
that the President may agree to do what he might do absent the agreement. Thus the Executive might make agreements which would be
binding on the citizenry generally in pursuit of its powers under the
authority of an act of Congress,"' its recognition power,"" its circumstantial prerogative, or its commander-in-chief power. The function
of the courts should then be the same whether the executive action is
bilateral or unilateral.'" Any more precise statement of the judicial
function must await clarification of the nature of the agreement power.
CONCLUSION

This outline of executive power has been intended only to bring
into focus the problem of judicial substitution of political judgment.
Whatever the inaccuracies of this analysis of executive power, the
political question doctrine has demonstrated notable vitality through
the years. The Supreme Court, in the Chicago & Southern and
Ludecke cases, has shown little inclination to be more assertive than
in the past. This seems altogether sound where the inquiry foreclosed
would necessitate judicial exploration into the ganglia of the nation's
foreign policy. The only choices in a case like Chicago & Southern
are for the courts to decide questions in the dark, require executive
disclosure, or declare executive impotence, or else leave the question
to executive judgment. The latter seems the least obnoxious. The
first is wholly impractical and the others would be debilitating to the
national security. If the nation is destroyed by its incapacity for
secrecy and dispatch, there can be no appeal. But the individual offended by executive tyranny may appeal to the Congress and to the
116. See McCLuRE, INTERNATIONAL ExEcuTIvE AGREEMENTS XI (1941).
117. E.g., B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
118. E.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).

119. Some support may be found for this view in a recent case in the Fourth Circuit
where Judge Parker held an executive agreement invalid because of a conflict with an
applicable statute. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953),
aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). See Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment,
Executive Agreements, and Imported Potatoes, 67 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1953).
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people. And where that appeal falls on deaf ears, the protection of
the courts is likely to be unavailing anyway.
Until the time comes when "open covenants are openly arrived at,"
there seems little choice but to confide to our leaders more power than
we like. The political question doctrine is additional evidence of the
truth of Dean Thayer's words:
Under no system can the courts go far to save a people from ruin;
our chief protection lies elsewhere. If this be true, it is of the
120
greatest public importance to put the matter in its true light.
The courts, in their independence and in their traditions, are the best
vehicles for the protection of the individual. But if these judicial
virtues are to be preserved, the judicial domain must be limited.
Congress and the Executive share the constitutional obligations to the
individual; the community and its leaders and not the courts, bear the
primary responsibility for seeing that this obligation is fulfilled. It is
a necessary feature of democracy that the self-governing are free to
be self-oppressing.

120. Thayer, The Orgin and Scope of American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARv. L. R~v. 129, 156 (1893).

